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As the date for EU enlargement approaches, the gates of the Eurozone will be opened to the
ten accession countries – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Hungary, Malta, and Cyprus. The pivotal question now is how and when these new
EU countries will enter through these gates, leaving their former national currencies behind.
In fact, three incumbent EU members with developed economies – Denmark, Sweden and the
UK – have not yet opted to take this route. Whatever scenario is chosen in the end, one thing
is clear: the Eurozone will expand within the medium-term horizon of 10 to 15 years. In
effect, this will be a massive institutional project, where the actual number of member
countries will increase by 67%. Naturally, this expansion will complicate the coordination and
decision-making processes, and this includes monetary policy.
Enlarging the Eurozone will also be a large-scale economic project, regardless of what the
current European GDP figures suggest at this time. Europe’s GDP will increase by only 5%
following EU enlargement in 2004 but GDP per capita will actually decline by 12%. It is
important, in particular, to look at the substantial rise in dissimilarities or variance inside the
EU when determining the economic effects of enlargement. Per capita GDP for the existing
EU member states is approximately twice as large as the average per capita GDP of the ten
accession economies, and the difference in the average price levels is very similar. These
large gaps will complicate coordination of economic policies – as well as the sharing of
monetary and exchange rate policies.
In view of the institutional and economic magnitude of Eurozone enlargement, the effects on
EU member states – old members as well as new – may in no way be taken lightly. It is,
therefore, important to repeatedly confront the issue: “When and how to introduce the euro”.
In essence, there are two scenarios for the timing of Eurozone enlargement: “rapid and
extensive” or “gradual and slower”. In addition, there are two basic ways to bridge the interim
period between EU entry and Eurozone entry: inflation targeting or using the exchange rate to
stabilise the economy. This article presents three different perspectives for looking at both
problems: the perspective of accession economies, the European perspective, and the
standpoint of economists who can contribute the results of their empirical studies to the
overall discussion.
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II. The perspective of accession economies
According to currently available information, the ten new members as a group would like to
introduce the euro relatively quickly after the EU entry. Table 1 present their initial positions
related to their euro-strategies. The accession economies give a variety of reasons for
supporting rapid and extensive enlargement of the Eurozone, some of which are political in
nature.
The accession economies understand the introduction of the euro as a signal that they will
become full-fledged members of the “European club”, and they believe that they are now
morally entitled to full membership. They would also like to start contributing to the future
shape and character of European monetary policy.
Many of the reasons that the accession economies give in favour of quickly adopting the euro
are based mainly on the experiences from the transition period. The countries have learnt that
in the case of international financial turbulence, excessive exchange rate volatility can damage
their financial sector. The costs of exchange rate and financial crises in the past significantly
complicated balancing of the public finances in some accession economies.
The accession economies consider the euro to be a defence or shield against the negative
effects of potential financial turbulence that could force them to abandon the existing
exchange rate regime. Such a situation could be very costly, especially for countries with a
currency board regime. Table 2 gives a summary of current monetary policy strategies of the
ten countries.
After joining the EU, the accession economies also foresee the possibility of a certain period
of accelerated FDI inflow similar to that which occurred in the mid-1990s, and they want to
avoid the costs associated with sterilisation policy that some of them they had to pay in the
past.
In addition, it is often said that the euro strengthens fiscal discipline, which has been
insufficient in some accession economies, and that it increases the credibility of domestic,
independent monetary policy, which has not had an opportunity to develop in countries using
exchange rate stability throughout the entire transition period.
In contrast, no accession country builds the reasoning of its strategy around the forward-
looking arguments. Specifically, a strategy is not typically selected according to whether or
not it would help them combat deflation and subsequent economic slowdown. The ten new
economies, after all, do not have a significant amount of experience with this yet.
Some of the accession countries also say that real convergence in their case is already far
enough along that, if the euro were adopted, a loss of economic policy autonomy would not
be painful. This, of course, is only valid for some countries. The majority of the accession
economies will still need independent economic policies to cope with the convergence
process.3
Table 1 – Euro-strategies: Initial positions (as of 2002)
Country Pre-announced date of entry
Cyprus As soon as possible
Czech Republic 2007-2010
Estonia As soon as possible
Hungary 2007-2009
Lithuania As soon as possible
Latvia 2006-2007
Malta As soon as possible
Poland 2007
Slovenia As soon as possible
Slovak Republic 2008-2010
Notes: In 2002, timing of the eurozone entry was not announced officially by the ten countries. The dates quoted
here were taken from speeches of national officials or pre-accession economic programmes and so they should
not be understood as “hard” commitments made by these countries.
Table 2 – Monetary policy: Current strategies (as of 2002)
Country Monetary policy
Cyprus Money targeting & +/- 15% band
Czech Republic Inflation targeting & managed floating
Estonia Currency board
Hungary Inflation targeting & +/- 15% bands
Lithuania Fixed exchange rate
Latvia Currency board
Malta Fixed exchange rate
Poland Inflation targeting & managed floating
Slovenia Inflation targeting & floating
Slovak Republic Inflation targeting & managed floating
Notes: Strategies reported here were described by national central banks in their official reports in 2002. In
several cases, central banks reported that they prepare a change in the strategy after joining the EU.4
III. The European perspective
While the accession economies as a whole are sending a signal that they want to entry the
Eurozone as quickly as possible (and even immediately), this issue is more complicated from
the European perspective. First of all, it must be realised that the history of the Eurozone is
relatively short. As opposed to EU enlargement, which actually began 30 years ago with the
signing of accession agreements with Malta and Cyprus, no party has had a sufficient amount
of time to prepare for massive Eurozone enlargement. The criteria for Eurozone entry were
defined only ten years ago, and the European Central Bank has been in existence for only five
years. The euro itself was put in circulation just two years ago. Therefore, everything
surrounding the euro is significantly less settled. The existing Eurozone members have
focused in particular on establishing the credibility of the new currency. From their
standpoint, Eurozone enlargement will come at a later time.
A second important factor from the European perspective is the fact that up to now the
monetary decision-making process could rely on the governors representing all participating
national central banks. Rapid and direct Eurozone enlargement could substantially complicate
decision-making on European rates. It would increase the gap related to the needs of
economic policy objectives for the member countries, and in turn, raise the tension inside the
Eurozone. The debate concerning rapid Eurozone enlargement increases the pressure on
institutional reform, which would emphasise the majority principle for voting on policy rates.
Institutional reforms will still be implemented for some time to come.
Even if institutional reforms are carried out, rapid Eurozone enlargement would not resolve
the problem related to the economic dimension of the enlargement project. Let us consider the
following example. If all 13 contenders were to now join the Eurozone, the majority principle
would probably lead to a debate on cutting interest rates, because 58% of the European
population would be satisfied with interest rate settings and 33% of the population would
need a cut in rates. On the other hand, 36% of the Eurozone members would need higher
nominal rates. The discrepancy between decision-making according to the majority principle
and national economic problems would, therefore, be significant.
Picture 1 illustrates that - in our example - the rapidly enlarged Eurozone would consist of
three groups of countries needing three different interest rate settings according to their
economic development. The first group would include three countries with low inflation and
growth that would welcome cuts in nominal rates. This group would only include existing
Eurozone members. The second group would consist of 13 countries that are content with the
current settings of European rates. This group would recruit three of the new accession
countries and seven existing member countries. The group would also include the three
current EU members that have not yet adopted the euro. The third group contains countries
that would need higher nominal rates in view of their higher inflation and growth rates. Only
two existing member countries would belong to this group, and the remaining six would come
from the ten accession countries.5























































Notes: Data on inflation and GDP growth for 2002 have been taken from the Eurostat database. A harmonised
price index is not available for Malta, therefore, the inflation value in the picture is zero.
Picture 1 is, of course, based on current data, but the extent of real convergence to be
achieved by the ten accession economies before catching up with the other EU member
countries is so great that disharmony between the majority and national principle will last at
least another decade. Another complication is the fact that three of the most developed EU
members are still not members of the Eurozone, and as was seen in the September 2003
referendum in Sweden, they may not be members for a long time to come. If these three
countries were to adopt the euro before the ten accession countries, it would help stabilise the
Eurozone. It would, in fact, strengthen the group of countries whose economic development is
in line with the current settings of monetary policy rates.
While the accession economies as a group are in a hurry to get in the Eurozone, from the
European standpoint, the question of “The euro: when and how?” can be answered as follows:
As soon as the Eurozone resolves its own initial problems and as soon as the accession
countries achieve real convergence
1. The accession countries should not expect miracles from
the euro and should try to resolve economic problems prior to the entry.
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IV. The researchers’ point of view: An empirical analysis
Both perspectives – the national and the European – offer cogent arguments, so it is not an
easy task to decide whether to enlarge the Eurozone at a rapid pace or not. Economists may
contribute the results of their empirical analyses to the debate. The empirical analysis, of
course, cannot cover all aspects of the discussion, but it can be a useful starting point for
deciding when and how to introduce the euro. From the standpoint of economists, the growth
rate of the standard of living is a relevant criterion when timing of the Eurozone entry is
discussed. If rapid Eurozone entry, or on the other hand, careful, prudent timing allows for
rapid standard of living growth, the empirical analysis simply indicates it as an appropriate
timing strategy regardless of the political arguments. Understandably, political arguments are
also important for the debate, and therefore, the analysis should be looked upon as a point of
departure for the discussion only. In addition, the empirical results are often model-dependent
and this should also be kept in mind.
In this section, the results of three studies are shown that developed out of a relatively
extensive international project. The work focused on the issue of timing for Eurozone entry,
the exchange rate regime choice for the interim period after EU entry and before adopting the
euro, and on the estimates of the fundamental real exchange rates which could be useful when
setting central parity for the exchange rate band prior to entering the ERMII. The work relies
on models of three accession economies: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The
macro-econometric models were estimated from a panel of data and then incorporated into the
NIGEM model which models all important economies and connects them with the help of
trade and financial flows. The empirical analysis was possible here to carry out in a consistent
model framework.
When analysing the issue of timing for Eurozone entry, the models were first used to project
the baseline scenario for a period of ten years. The baseline scenario was based on the
assumptions that a country does not entry the Eurozone and continues to target inflation.
Following this, comparison simulations were carried out in which the domestic exchange rate
was fixed to the euro in a certain year between 2005 and 2009. A recommendation for
appropriate timing for Eurozone entry was derived from the relative costs of the specific
scenarios. The relative costs were measured in percentage of GDP
2.
Picture 2 provides a comparison of relative costs in relation to the baseline scenario for all
three countries in every year between 2005 and 2009 for a period of one, two and five years
after accession. Although we could have doubts about the accuracy of the individual figures,
the results, in which the three analysed countries react to adopting the euro differently, are
considered to be robust. Although the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland belong to the
same geographical region, the timing of their entry should be set on an individual basis
according to the characteristics of their specific economies, and they should not attempt at all
costs to adopt the euro at the same time.
According to the empirical analysis, Poland would benefit from adopting the euro – even if
adopted very quickly and prior to completing real convergence. If the euro is adopted later,
the benefits are greater. Hungary would lose out at first by adopting the euro at an overly
rapid pace. If the exchange rate were fixed around 2007, these costs would slowly disappear.
Quickly adopting the euro is most costly for the Czech Republic, and the economic costs
associated with adopting the euro would disappear the slowest over time.
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PO (after 1 year) PO (after 2 years)  PO  (after 5 years)  
HU (after 1 year) HU (after 2 years)  HU  (after 5 years)  
CR (after 1 year) CR  (after 2 years)  CR  (after 5 years)  
Note: The comparison of relative costs in relation to the baseline simulation scenario was made in % of GDP
always 1, 2, and 5 years after Eurozone entry. Country abbreviations: PO = Poland, HU = Hungary, and CR =
Czech Republic.
With the help of the same system of models, another empirical analysis was carried out
focusing on the exchange rate regime choice for the interim period after EU entry and before
Eurozone entry. The analysis was based on the consideration that the accession countries
should choose between inflation targeting and medium-term stabilisation based on the ERMII
mechanism, according to which stabilisation strategy better protects it from the effects of
economic shocks
3. The results of both empirical analyses are summarised in Table 3.
Table 3 – Results of the empirical analysis
Poland Hungary Czech Republic
Appropriate timing
for Eurozone entry
Rapid Somewhat rapid Cautious
Appropriate
stabilisation strategy
for the interim period












According to the empirical analysis based on the models in the NIGEM system, Eurozone
entry could be rapid for Poland, somewhat rapid for Hungary and should be more or less
cautious for the Czech Republic. The ERMII could fulfil the role of a stabilisation policy
instrument in Poland. Hungary could use both strategies with similar results. The most
beneficial for the Czech Republic would be inflation targeting. Why are the results of the
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empirical analysis different for the three accession economies? It is because the models
capture some of the differences in the characteristics of each economy.
Poland is a relatively closed economy where appreciation of the real exchange rate slows
down GDP growth less than in open economies. The share of foreign trade in GDP is lower.
In addition, Poland had a high-risk premium in the past, and so higher credibility of European
monetary policy allows for substantial rate cuts. Both of these factors lead to the conclusion
that adopting the euro is not costly for Poland in relation to a slowdown in convergence, at
least in our model.
Hungary is more open than Poland, and this is why GDP growth is slowed down more by real
exchange rate appreciation. However, Hungary has, according to our estimates, a relatively
flexible economy that can adjust relatively quickly to shocks, which substitutes to a large
degree for a floating exchange rate. The Czech Republic has the most open economy though,
according to our estimates, also the most inflexible economy. Fixing the exchange rate in
combination with the loss of independent monetary policy would lead to the highest relative
loss in relation to GDP.
The estimates of fundamental real exchange rates (FRER) could become an important source
of information during the discussion on introducing the ERMII exchange rate band or on
setting the central parity band. FRERs show the values of the real effective exchange rates
that would be in line with the chosen set of important economic variables. According to
FRER methodology, important economic variables include domestic and foreign growth, FDI
inflow, and the level of foreign indebtedness
4. As in the past two cases, here it also allows for
the use of the NIGEM model system to estimate the FRER in a consistent framework and also
to perform simulations of FRER values for the upcoming period. Since FRER calculations are
sensitive to a variety of assumptions, it is better to compare the values of real effective
exchange rates with the bands that capture the results of the extensive sensitivity tests rather
than to compare them with the baseline FRER estimate alone, which is less robust. Picture 3
shows the FRER estimates for the koruna as an example.
ERMII central parity is usually set in line with exchange rate market values, and therefore, the
question of timing for fixing parity is very important. The calculated FRER values may be
compared with real exchange rate values. It may then be assessed whether or not the
competitiveness of the domestic economy would be threatened by introducing an exchange
rate band due to overvaluation of the currency or whether or not domestic financial assets
would depreciate due to strong undervaluation of the currency. In both cases, introducing an
ERMII band could be problematic. FRER estimates for the medium term could also show
how easy it would be to meet the Maastricht criteria focused on maintaining low inflation and
a stable exchange rate simultaneously. If FRER estimates are unstable, this parallel
stabilisation could be difficult.
The results of the FRER estimates for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are again
different, even though the economies are similar from a geographical aspect. The FRER
estimates indicated that the koruna was overvalued in 2002 in a range of 5%, and that in the
medium term horizon, the trend of real appreciation is expected to continue, but at a slower
tempo than in the past. In the case of the forint, the appreciation signals in 2002 were stronger
(approximately 15%). According to the FRER estimates, the zloty in 2002 was relatively
strongly overvalued (in a range of 30%). In the medium term, the zloty estimate is the least
stable in the group of the three central European currencies.
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The differences in the FRER estimates for the three accession economies can again
considered to be a robust result. As pointed out earlier, this is caused by the different
characteristics of the three economies. With the FRER estimates, this involves in particular
the difference in the structure of trading partners and in certain condition variables. An
important role in FRER estimates is played by the ability of an economy to attract FDI, which
increases productivity, and foreign indebtedness, which can create financial limitations and
slow the process of real convergence. FDI inflow in the past being relatively high and foreign
indebtedness not being so limiting as in the case of Poland can explain why in the Czech
Republic the koruna experienced relatively low overvaluation in 2002 and why the FRER
estimates were relatively stable in the medium term.
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 Note: The basic estimate of the fundamental koruna real exchange rate (along with the band expressing the
uncertainty associated with the estimate) is given as CRFEER. The observed values of the real effective koruna
exchange rate are expressed as a CRRER variable.10
VI. Conclusions
The conclusions from the empirical analysis indicate that the accession economies are
different in nature, and for this reason, the appropriateness of rapid or slow Eurozone entry as
well as the appropriateness of alternative stabilisation strategies for the interim period
between EU entry and Eurozone entry must be assessed separately for each economy. The
accession economies should not compete with each other to be the first new Eurozone
member without considering their specific economic situation.
Rapid entry could be beneficial for a country that does not have an established tradition of
domestic monetary policy or for a country that has made significant progress with real
convergence. More prudent timing for Eurozone entry would be better for a country that has a
credible monetary policy, that still has a significant amount of real convergence in front of
them and that does not have a very flexible economy. The Czech Republic, for the most part,
belongs to this second group of countries.
The empirical analysis, therefore, tends to support the view that it would be more beneficial to
expand the Eurozone at a gradual pace. Slower and gradual Eurozone enlargement would also
be more beneficial from the European perspective. If the Eurozone countries are too diverse,
there will be a problem with internal stability – even after implementing institutional reforms,
which should change the principle of decision-making on European rates over to the majority
principle.
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